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Abstract 
The corruption is a complex and generalized phenomenon all over the world, with 
cultural,  social,  psychological,  political  and  economical  dimensions.  The  defining 
and the studying of the phenomenon are going through the most different thinking 
filters known in the specialized literature: social-cultural, political, administrative 
and economic. The article’s aim is to quantify and analyze the relationship between 
corruption  and  political,  administrative  and  economic  determinants  factors, 
through a regressive "pool data" model. The sample includes 135 countries of the 
world, from all continents, with different degrees of economic development and 
political-administrative structures, for the period 1996-2008. What is interesting is 
that, the study shows the distortion into the government intervention function in 
the  economy,  seen  as  a  significant  proliferation  factor  for  the  corruption 
phenomenon.  This  connection  has  different  intensity,  as  the  state  is  developed, 
developing or in transition. Moreover, there is a number of unobserved factors, 
which  emphasizes  or  temperate  in  temporal  approach  the  relationship  between 
corruption - political, administrative and economic determinants factors. 
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1. Introduction 
The corruption is a complex and generalized phenomenon all over the world, with 
economical,  cultural,  social,  psychological,  political,  administrative  and  religious 
dimensions. By consequence, defining and the studying of the phenomenon are 
going through the most different thinking filters known in the specialized literature: 
economic, social-cultural, political, administrative and religious. In the economic 
approach, the government controls the distribution of revenues and the taxation of 
onerous costs. The private individuals and firms, in such context, tend to receive 
the advantages from public authority. If the “payment for advantages” is illegal, 
then we can talk about corruption. In an institutional view,  for Rose-Ackerman 
(1999), the corruption is a symptom for the situations in which the management of 
the state is inefficient. 
All these factors are acting differently, as countries are developed, developing or in 
transition.  According  to  Cyper  &  Dietz  (2008),  performed  over  time,  it  was 
observed  that  the  developed  economies,  with  strong  industrial  sectors  and 
competitive  market,  have  a  low  level  of  corruption.  On  the  opposite  side, 
corruption proliferates in the developing countries and those in transition, with 
poorly developed economic sectors and weak competitive markets. Moreover, the 
factors intensity can be “accentuated or temperate" temporally under the parallel 
influence of unobserved factors, such as: culture, psychosocial individual profile, 
technological changes, change of government  fiscal policies, natural cataclysms, 
wars or other internal conflicts.  
2. Theoretical Fundaments 
In the economical view, Shleifer and Vishny (1993) see the corruption as a problem 
related  to  the  monopolistic  market  structure,  not  a  competitive  one,  and 
recommend  that  policies  should  focus  more  closely  on  the  phenomenon  of 
corruption  and  not  on  the  public  sector  itself.  In  a  particular  way,  Al-Marhubi 
(2000)  finds  a  significant  relationship  between  inflation  and  corruption,  which 
suggests that a high rate of inflation came with a high corruption. For Wang & 
Rosenau (2001), the corruption is the secret collaboration between public officials 
and  private  actors  for  private  financial  gains  in  contravention  of  the  public’s 
interest 
Drehel and Schneider (2006) connect the shadow economy with corruption, as an 
inverse or direct relationship, depending on the degree of the state development. 
Based on a model of general trade policy and fiscal economic equilibrium, Carraro 
et  al.  (2006)  shows  that  corruption  affects  economic  growth  with  different 
intensities from one period to another (many studies refute this results). Moreover, 
connecting with economic growth, a couple of authors identify and analyze the The Effect of the Government Intervention in Economy on Corruption 
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inverse relationship between corruption and the level of social welfare. From this 
group we regard Svensson (2005). 
In the social-cultural sense, Nye (1967) considers the corruption as a deviation from 
the formal duties of a public role, in individual compartmental approach: personal, 
close family and private clique. The definition summarizes a group of elements, 
such  as  bribery,  theft,  nepotism  and  misappropriation.  Hungtington  (1969) 
identifies different degrees of corruption, from one culture to another, with higher 
intensity in the modernization periods, the corruption being a social pathology, 
according to Carvajal (1999).  
Husted (1999) describes a cultural profile of a corrupt country as one in which 
there  is  high  uncertainty  avoidance,  high  masculinity,  and  high  power  distance 
(without  individualism,  which  is  highly  correlated  with GNP  per  capita).  Getz  & 
Volkema (2001) revealed that uncertainty avoidance moderated the relationship 
between  economic  adversity  and  corruption,  whereas  power  distance  and 
uncertainty avoidance were positively associated with corruption.  
Nichols  et  al.  (2004),  based  on  a  study  that  includes  two  states  on  different 
continents, argues that the  corruption perception seeks  the recent history of a 
population, determined by the foreign domination, the democratic change and the 
transition periods. Barr and Serra (2006) see the corruption as a phenomenon set 
of preferences and rules, following the slogan "not engaging in bribery because it is 
harmful  to  society".  They  conclude,  concise,  that  the  corruption  is,  in  parte,  a 
cultural phenomenon.  
In  the  political-administrative  approach,  Hungtington  (1969)  reveals  that  the 
phenomenon of corruption is an effective absence of the political institutions and 
Rose-Ackerman (1978)  shows that the decentralization of government decision-
making power increases the risk of corruption, because the review and detection 
limits  are  confirmed.  Tanzi  (1998)  accepts  the  definition  of  the  World  Bank,  in 
which  the  corruption  is  the  simplest  kind  of  public  power  abuse  for  private 
benefits, gifts, mainly related to the state monopoly and the way the government 
perceives the power. Simply, in a similar way, Rajib and Subarna (2000) develop a 
general  definition  of  the  corruption,  as  an  abuse  of  public  power  for  private 
benefit. Referring to the quality of bureaucratic apparatus, Drehel and Schneider 
(2006) show that the better quality of the public institutions reduces corruption. 
In the religious perspective, a previous research has found that religion influences 
the tendency of the corruption phenomena. According to Deveterre (2002), the 
high attention to virtue ethics is the most  effective way to combat  corruption. 
Moreover,  religions,  such  as  Christianity,  may  limit  the  effects  of  this  global 
problem. Particularly, Paldham (2001) founds that the percentage of Protestants 
was  negatively  related  to  corruption,  after  controlling  for  known  economic 
predictors (real gross domestic product per capita). Several years after, Jude (2004) Mutascu Mihai IOAN 
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considers  that  the  percentage  of  Protestants  within  a  nation  will  be  negatively 
related to the level of corruption within a national economy.  
This scientific approach is intended to analyze the relationship between corruption 
and  its  determinant  factors  of  political-administrative  and  economic  nature. 
According to the mentioned premise, all the theoretical presented elements allow 
us to formulate a series of theoretical working assumptions, which consider two of 
the approaching coordinates of corruption: one politico-administrative coordinate 
and another economical one. 
The hypotheses are: 
H1: The level of corruption is growing as the civil liberties are less respected; the 
government structures and the government intervention in the economy are more 
extended. 
H2: The level of corruption is growing as the social welfare is decreasing.  
In summary, the meanings of the hypothesis’ work relations are: 
Table 1: The sense (“the sings”) of the hypothesis’ work relations 
The trend of 
corruption level  The determinant factors of corruption 
The trend of determinant 
factors of corruption 
+  1. Civil liberty  - 
+  2. Public administration structures  + 
+  3. Government intervention in economy  + 
+  4. Social welfare  - 
-  1. Civil liberty  + 
-  2. Public administration structures  - 
-  3. Government intervention in economy  - 
-  4. Social welfare  + 
The  fundamental  assumption  is  that  corruption  is  a  complex  phenomenon 
determined  by  a  couple  of  factors,  such  as:  civil  liberties,  the  administrative 
government structure, the intensity of state intervention in economy and the level 
of social welfare. The linkages are in the same sense for the case of administrative 
government structure and the intensity of government intervention and contrary 
for the case of civil liberties and social welfare. Moreover, these factors are acting 
differently over the time from one type of economy to another and there are a 
number of unobserved disturbances. 
3. Methods and Results 
To quantify and analyze the relationship between corruption (dependent variable) 
and  politico-administrative  and  economic  determinants  factors  (independent 
variables), were considered the period 1996-2008 and a sample of 135 countries of 
the world, from all continents, with different degrees of economic development The Effect of the Government Intervention in Economy on Corruption 
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and political-administrative  structures. According  to Cyper & Dietz (2008), for a 
complex approach, the data set was divided into three cross-sectional panels, as 
economies are developed - 34 countries, developing - 87 countries and in transition 
- 14 countries (UNCTAD classification 2009 - Annex). The corruption is quantified by 
the  "Freedom  from  corruption”  index  -  FC  (the  component  of  the  Index  of 
Economic Freedom), developed by The Heritage Foundation, on a scale from 0 to 
100, where 0 indicates a very high level of corruption and 100 an extremely small 
one. 
The "Civil Liberties" (L) factor is founded by Freedom House - Civil Liberties, the 
"government  structure"  (GS)  factor  is  quantified  by  The  Heritage  Foundation  - 
Government Size (the component of the Index of Economic Freedom) and "social 
welfare" (HDI) factor is constructed by the United Nations Development Program - 
The Human Development Index. 
1.  The  "Civil  Liberties"  index  includes  the  freedom  of  expression,  assembly, 
association, education and religion and has a range of intensity between 1 and 7; 
the value of 1 is assigned to the states in which the degree of freedom is very high 
and 7 to the ones which have a very small one. 
2.  The  "Government  size”  index  is  a  component  of  the  "Index  of  Economic 
Freedom", which considers the level of government expenditure as a percentage of 
GDP, including all levels of government, such as central/federal, intermediate/state 
and  local  level.  The  scale  value  is  between  0  and  100.  The  minimum  level 
corresponds to the states which have a small government spending of GDP, with a 
reduce redistribution of GDP and government intervention in economy and vice 
versa. 
3. The "Human Development Index" measures the degree of human development 
by combining life expectancy, education levels and realized income, on a scale from 
0 to 1, where 0 denotes a minimum level of welfare and 1 a maximum one. 
Because  the  considered  factors  have  different  scales  of  measurement,  for  a 
comparative analysis, the levels of variables were normalized: 
Min Max
Max
Normalized GS L FC GS L FC
GS L FC GS L FC
GS L FC
, , , ,
, , , ,
, ,
-
-
=
                          (1) 
[ ] 1 , 0 , , Î Normalized GS L FC
                                                       (2) 
[ ] 1 , 0 Î HDI                                                                (3) 
In this case, for FC - 0 indicates a very high level of corruption and 1 an extremely 
small one; for L - 0 is assigned to the states in which the degree of freedom is very Mutascu Mihai IOAN 
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high and 1 to the ones which have a very small one; and for GS - 0 is the minimum 
level corresponds to the states which have a small government spending of GDP 
and 1 to the ones which have a high government spending of GDP. 
Based  on  the  normalized  illustrated  variables,  the  sense  of  changes  existing 
between  corruption  and  its  determinant  factors,  in  according  with  theoretical 
assumptions made above, is as follows: 
Table 2: The expected sense (“the sings”) of the relations between FC - L, 
GS and HDI, according to working hypothesis 
The trend of FC index  The determinant index of FC  The determinant index expected trend 
-  1. L  + 
-  2. GS  + 
-  3. HDI  - 
+  1. L  - 
+  2. GS  - 
+  3. HDI  + 
The method of analysis used is the econometrical modeling (with software EViews 
5.0), elaborating three “Pool Date”1 regressive models, with time-fixed effects, one 
for each type of economy, with this shape: 
ij t it it v λ βxX α Y + + + =
                                                   (4) 
where Yit represents the dependent variable - FC, α intercept term, β independent 
variables coefficients, Xit independent variable - L, GS and HDI,  t λ
 time-varying 
intercept (captures all of the variables that affect Yit and that vary over time but 
are  constant  cross-sectionally), ij v
  the  remainder  disturbance  (capturing 
everything that is left unexplained about Yit), i cross-sectional units observed for 
dated periods - (the number of states) and t the period of time (years 1996-2008). 
With dummy variables, the model could be: 
ij t T t 2 t 1 it it v xDT λ   ... xD2 λ xD1 λ βxX Y + + + + + =
                (5) 
where D1 represents the dummy variable that takes the value 1 for the 1996 year 
and 0 elsewhere, and so on. 
Finally, the model becomes:  
                                                           
1 For econometric model we used the econometric software Eviews 5.0. The Effect of the Government Intervention in Economy on Corruption 
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it 2008 T 1996 it 3 it 2 it 1 it v D   x ... xD xHDI β xGS β xL β FC + + + + + + = l l 1     (6)  
For testing of three models, I corrected both period heteroskedasticity and general 
correlation of observations (except the second model, only with heteroskedasticity 
correction) within a given cross-section because the observations are not equal 
weight in estimation. Moreover, to obtain the robust coefficient standard errors I 
applied the Period SUR (PCSE) method. 
The econometric analysis of three type economy has two steps: 
a. The econometric tests of the “pool data” time-fixed effects models. 
b. The “unit root test” of the residuals. 
Step1. The econometric tests of the “pool data” time-fixed effects models, for each 
type of economies, are presented in Appendix, Tables A1-A3. 
For all type of economies, the tests of models show the following:  
- the absolute values of the standard errors corresponding to the coefficients of the 
function are lower than the values of the coefficients, witch sustains the correct 
estimation of these coefficients (a conclusion reinforced by the low values of the 
probabilities); 
- the value of the correlation coefficient, shows a significant statistical correlation 
between the dependent variable - FC and the independent variables - L, GS and HDI 
(the changes in the FC are reflected considerably in the changes of L, GS and HDI); 
- the value of F-statistic is bigger then the F-critical value (the probability is almost 
0), showing that the model is relevant; 
- the Durbin-Watson test (with a resulting value under the critical point of 2) shows 
that the residual variables are not autocorrelated. 
Step 2. The “unit root test” of the residuals. For verifying the stationarity of the 
residuals are used the “unit root tests” proposes by Levin, Lin & Chu, Breitung t-
stat, Im, Pesaran & Shin W-stat, ADF, PP and Hadri Z-stat. The results are illustrated 
in Appendix, Tables A4-A6.  
For  the  developed  and  developing  economies  the  tests  Levin,  Lin  &  Chu;  Im, 
Pesaran & Shin W-stat; ADF and PP indicate that the null hypothesis is rejected 
(except  Hadri  Z-stat  test  and,  partially,  the  Breitung  t-stat),  meaning  that  the 
“residuals of the cross-sectional group” is stationary.  
At limit, for economies in transition, the tests Levin, Lin & Chu; the Breitung t-stat; 
Im, Pesaran & Shin W-stat; ADF and PP indicate that the null hypothesis of the unit 
root can be rejected (except Hadri Z-stat test). Mutascu Mihai IOAN 
 
 
Page | 62                                                                               EJBE 2009, 2(3) 
In conclusion, all three models may be considered representative to describe, at 
international level, the connection between FC and L, GS & HDI.  
4. Discussion 
The obtained results based on the three constructed models show that corruption 
is  mainly  the  result  of  political-administrative  and  economic  factors.  The  main 
information can be summaries in this way:  
Table 7: The main results of relationship between “FC-L, GS and HDI” in 
the case of developed economies, developing economies and economy in 
transition 
Developed economies  Developing economies  Economies in transition 
Type of economies 
Coefficients 
C  -2.2014  0.1424  0.1651 
L  -0.2824  -0.1159  -0.1091 
GS  -0.0407  -0.1705  -0.1873 
HDI  3.1875  0.5449  0.3190 
Year  Period fixed (dummy variables) 
1996  0.0948  0.0426  -0.0246 
1997  0.0621  0.0392  -0.0268 
1998  0.0819  0.0244  -0.0070 
1999  0.0547  0.0225  -0.0068 
2000  -0.0018  0.0083  0.0147 
2001  0.0070  0.0108  0.0090 
2002  0.0083  0.0149  -0.0026 
2003  -0.0421  -0.0050  0.0159 
2004  -0.0435  -0.0194  0.0216 
2005  -0.0584  -0.0262  0.0031 
2006  -0.0623  -0.0227  -0.0044 
2007  -0.0534  -0.0128  0.0019 
2008  -0.0474  -0.0132  0.0061 
All  three  elaborated  models  confirm  the  proposed  theoretical  hypotheses, 
following the idea that the increasing of corruption (minimizing FC index) is the 
result of the limitation of civil liberties (maximizing L index), the extension of public 
administration  structures,  the  augmentation  of  government  intervention  in 
economy (maximizing GS index) and the damage of social welfare (minimizing HDI 
index). The Effect of the Government Intervention in Economy on Corruption 
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In other words, the corruption is high, if the civil liberties are reduced, the structure 
of  government  is  extended,  the  government  intervention  in  the  economy  is 
increased and the social welfare is decreased. Per a contrario, the corruption is low, 
if  the  civil  liberties  are  higher,  the  structure  of  government  is  reduced,  the 
government intervention in the economy is decreased and the social welfare is 
increased. 
These  influences  are  different  intensity  as  the  economies  are  developed, 
developing or in transition. More, there are other several disturbing unobservable 
factors,  with  constant  and  periodic  action.  The  periodic  factors  act  on  the 
corruption differently, from one year to another, in positive or negative sense, but 
they have very little effect on corruption (the impact is less than 10% annually). 
In the developed economies the main factor of corruption is the social welfare, 
followed  by  civil  liberties,  government  structure  and  intensity  of  the  state 
intervention in economy. In developing economies and economies in transition the 
corruption depends mainly on the social welfare, then on the state intervention in 
economy and civil liberties. 
On this basis, a low level of corruption is assimilated to developed economies, with 
high life expectancy, strong literacy and educational attainment and high level of 
GDP per capita. In this country people have freedoms of expression and belief, 
associational  and  organizational  rights  and  personal  autonomy  without 
interference  from  the  state.  Moreover,  the  bureaucratic  structures  are  less 
extensive and state intervention in economy is more temperate, encouraging the 
private initiative and market competition rules.  
Unfortunately,  in  the  developed  economies  there  are  significant  unobserved 
factors that constantly stimulate corruption, but also there is a set of unobserved 
factors with periodical positive or negative actions, with insignificant influence. 
A high level of corruption is characteristic for developing economies or economies 
in  transition,  because  the  life  expectancy  is  low,  the  degree  of  literacy  and 
education is precarious and the level of GDP per capita is low. In addition, freedoms 
of expression and belief are low, associational and organizational rights limited and 
personal autonomy has strong interference from the state.  
In these economies the state has developed an excessive bureaucratic structure 
and the state’s corrective intervention in economy determines often distortions 
and inefficiencies in the resource allocation. 
In  contrast  to  developed  economies,  in  the  developing  economies  and  the 
economies in transition the constant unobserved factors have a major destructive 
influence on corruption. Similarly, the unobserved factors with periodical acting 
have an insignificant positive or negative influence. Mutascu Mihai IOAN 
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5. Conclusions 
As a complex phenomenon, the corruption hits the entire world, regardless of the 
geographical location, population, level of economic development, political regime 
or type of government. 
There  are  two  categories  of  factors  that  influence  the  corruption:  some  are 
observed  and  have  constant  periodic  influence  (social  welfare,  civil  liberties, 
government structure and intensity of the state intervention in economy), while 
others  factors  are  unobserved,  with  stimulative  or  nonstimulative,  constant  or 
periodic influences. 
Main  observable  factors  act  differently  as  the  economies  are  developed, 
developing or in transition. 
In the developed economies the most important factor is the level of social welfare, 
followed by civil liberties and government size. In other economies, social welfare is 
followed by the government size, not by civil liberties. In addition, all these factors 
are  "corrected"  by  a  set  of  unobservable  influences,  positive  or  negative,  with 
constant or periodic acting. 
In  such  conditions,  the  improvement  of  corruption  phenomenon  is  difficult  to 
undertake. However, based on the described results, we believe that the corrective 
measures of corruption must be identified and divided in two categories: one for 
the  developed  economies  and  other  for  the  developing  and  economies  in 
transition. 
a.  The  improvement  of  corruption  in  developed  economies  must  be  focused 
mainly on the public health system efficiency (maximizing life expectancy) and the 
consolidation  of  educational  system  (maximizing  the  degree  of  literacy  and  the 
level of educational attainment). 
A  second  action,  in  order  of  importance,  is  strengthens  of  all  freedoms  of 
expression  and  belief,  associational  and  organizational  rights  and  personal 
autonomy toward state.  
In  the  developed  economies,  the  extension  of  bureaucracy  and  the  state 
intervention in economy may be adjusted from a minimum level of efficiency to a 
maximum level, which corresponds to the point where they exceed the degree of 
social welfare and civil liberties. 
A great attention should be paid in these economies on unobserved factors that 
have a strong, stimulative and constant influence on corruption and exceed the 
positive  unobserved  periodical  factors  (period  dummy).  Therefore,  regarding The Effect of the Government Intervention in Economy on Corruption 
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corruption,  the  countries  with  developed  economies  have  a  high  sensitivity  to 
certain nonperiodical factors. 
b. The improvement of corruption in developing economies and economies in 
transition must be focused preponderant on the public health reforms (increase of 
the  life  expectancy  level)  and  the  reconstruction  of  the  educational  system 
(positive effect on degree of literacy and level of educational attainment).  
A second step should be polarized on compression of the bureaucracy structures, 
the  increase  of  the  bureaucratic  professionalism  and  performance  and 
implementation of the measures to correct the market allocations, distribution and 
stabilization.  Moreover,  the  state  must  "cement"  the  private  initiative  and  the 
market competition rules. 
Not  least,  these  countries  must  make  serious  efforts  to  strength  democracy, 
respecting the freedoms of expression and belief, associational and organizational 
rights and personal autonomy toward state.  
A big advantage of developing and in transition economies is given by unobserved 
nonperiodical  factors  that  have  a  small  but  destructive  influence  on  corruption 
(highest in the transition economies). Moreover, these constant factors counteract 
successfully the unobserved temporal negative factors. 
In conclusion, we can appreciate that the improvement measures of corruption 
phenomenon should be adapted as economies are developed, developing or in 
transition. Moreover, in a state with developed economy a great attention must be 
focused on the unobserved constant factors, these types of economies showing a 
high sensitivity in this sense. 
The  main  results  suggest  that  the  corruption  is  a  “key  question”  especially  in 
developing and in transition economies, but the disturbance constant unobserved 
factors  decrease  the  phenomenon  and  compensate  the  periodical  negative 
unobserved factors. 
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Appendix  
Table A1: The econometric tests of the “pool data” time-fixed effects model  
FC-L, GS and HDI - Developed economies 
Dependent Variable: FC?     
Method: Pooled EGLS (Period SUR)   
Date: 05/23/09  Time: 18:09     
Sample: 1996 2008     
Included observations: 13     
Cross-sections included: 34     
Total pool (balanced) observations: 442   
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
Period weights (PCSE) standard errors & covariance (no d.f. correction) 
         
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob. 
         
          C  -2.201361  0.271578  -8.105822  0.0000 
L?  -0.282434  0.052179  -5.412787  0.0000 
GS?  -0.040743  0.020367  -2.000468  0.0461 
HDI?  3.187540  0.298404  10.68196  0.0000 
Fixed Effects (Period)         
1996--C  0.094760       
1997--C  0.062134       
1998--C  0.081941       
1999--C  0.054703       
2000--C  -0.001758       
2001--C  0.007019       
2002--C  0.008297       
2003--C  -0.042120       
2004--C  -0.043547       
2005--C  -0.058358       
2006--C  -0.062332       
2007--C  -0.053380       
2008--C  -0.047359       
         
  Effects Specification     
         
          Period fixed (dummy variables)   
         
  Weighted Statistics     
         
          R-squared  0.680544      Mean dependent var  1.385802 
Adjusted R-squared  0.669296      S.D. dependent var  1.732771 
S.E. of regression  0.996462      Sum squared resid  422.9913 
F-statistic  60.50123      Durbin-Watson stat  1.978590 
Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000       
         
  Unweighted Statistics     
         
R-squared  0.632566      Mean dependent var  0.649946 
Sum squared resid  8.396228      Durbin-Watson stat  0.304257 
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Table A2: The econometric tests of the “pool data” time-fixed effects model 
FC-L, GS and HDI - Developing economies 
Dependent Variable: FC?     
Method: Pooled EGLS (Cross-section weights)   
Date: 05/23/09   Time: 18:09     
Sample: 1996 2008     
Included observations: 13     
Cross-sections included: 87     
Total pool (balanced) observations: 1131   
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
Period weights (PCSE) standard errors & covariance (no d.f. correction) 
         
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob. 
         
          C  0.142492  0.020791  6.853494  0.0000 
L?  -0.115900  0.011634  -9.962188  0.0000 
GS?  -0.170513  0.019265  -8.851125  0.0000 
HDI?  0.544997  0.016274  33.48911  0.0000 
Fixed Effects (Period)         
1996--C  0.042580       
1997--C  0.039202       
1998--C  0.024439       
1999--C  0.022467       
2000--C  0.008307       
2001--C  0.010848       
2002--C  0.014932       
2003--C  -0.004954       
2004--C  -0.019449       
2005--C  -0.026229       
2006--C  -0.022748       
2007--C  -0.012767       
2008--C  -0.013192       
         
  Effects Specification     
         
          Period fixed (dummy variables)   
         
  Weighted Statistics     
         
          R-squared  0.740736      Mean dependent var  0.437109 
Adjusted R-squared  0.737248      S.D. dependent var  0.308896 
S.E. of regression  0.158338      Sum squared resid  27.95410 
F-statistic  212.3757      Durbin-Watson stat  1.960999 
Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000       
         
            Unweighted Statistics     
         
          R-squared  0.316376      Mean dependent var  0.296764 
Sum squared resid  28.36319      Durbin-Watson stat  0.129329 
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Table A3: The econometric tests of the “pool data” time-fixed effects model 
FC-L, GS and HDI – Economies in transition 
Dependent Variable: FC?     
Method: Pooled EGLS (Period SUR)   
Date: 05/23/09   Time: 18:33     
Sample: 1996 2008     
Included observations: 13     
Cross-sections included: 14     
Total pool (balanced) observations: 182   
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
Period weights (PCSE) standard errors & covariance (no d.f. correction) 
         
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob. 
         
          C  0.165086  0.021603  7.641883  0.0000 
L?  -0.109092  0.006595  -16.54245  0.0000 
GS?  -0.187252  0.004235  -44.21857  0.0000 
HDI?  0.318981  0.027749  11.49523  0.0000 
Fixed Effects (Period)         
1996--C  -0.024648       
1997--C  -0.026826       
1998--C  -0.006954       
1999--C  -0.006837       
2000--C  0.014686       
2001--C  0.008961       
2002--C  -0.002604       
2003--C  0.015910       
2004--C  0.021613       
2005--C  0.003104       
2006--C  -0.004368       
2007--C  0.001884       
2008--C  0.006079       
         
  Effects Specification     
         
          Period fixed (dummy variables)   
         
  Weighted Statistics     
         
          R-squared  0.990013      Mean dependent var  2.168570 
Adjusted R-squared  0.989111      S.D. dependent var  9.939635 
S.E. of regression  1.037226      Sum squared resid  178.5890 
F-statistic  1097.040      Durbin-Watson stat  1.998995 
Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000       
         
            Unweighted Statistics     
         
          R-squared  0.346309      Mean dependent var  0.210363 
Sum squared resid  1.155049      Durbin-Watson stat  0.542193 
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Table A4: The “unit root test” of the residuals - Developed economies 
Group unit root test: Summary    
Date: 05/23/09   Time: 18:54   
Sample: 1996 2008     
Series: RESIDAUSTRALIA, RESIDAUSTRIA, RESIDBELGIUM, 
… RESIDUNITEDSTATES     
Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
Automatic selection of maximum lags   
Automatic selection of lags based on SIC: 0 to 2 
Newey-West bandwidth selection using Bartlett kernel 
         
      Cross-   
Method  Statistic  Prob.**  sections  Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t*  -10.9395   0.0000   34   389 
Breitung t-stat  -0.29030   0.3858   34   355 
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat   -8.18247   0.0000   34   389 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square   191.506   0.0000   34   389 
PP - Fisher Chi-square   199.824   0.0000   34   408 
Null: No unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Hadri Z-stat   8.56268   0.0000   34   442 
         
** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asympotic Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
 
Table A5: The “unit root test” of the residuals - Developing economies 
Group unit root test: Summary    
Date: 05/25/09   Time: 18:09   
Sample: 1996 2008     
Series: RESIDALGERIA, RESIDARGENTINA, RESIDBAHRAIN, 
… RESIDZAMBIA     
Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
Automatic selection of maximum lags   
Automatic selection of lags based on SIC: 0 to 2 
Newey-West bandwidth selection using Bartlett kernel 
         
      Cross-   
Method  Statistic  Prob.**  sections  Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t*  -12.8730   0.0000   87   1000 
Breitung t-stat  -0.68155   0.2478   87   913 
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat   -5.71864   0.0000   87   1000 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square   319.317   0.0000   87   1000 
PP - Fisher Chi-square   337.890   0.0000   87   1044 
Null: No unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Hadri Z-stat   14.3549   0.0000   87   1131 
         
** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asympotic Chi-square distribution. 
        All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
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Table A6: The “unit root test” of the residuals - Developing economies 
Group unit root test: Summary    
Date: 05/23/09   Time: 19:06   
Sample: 1996 2008     
Series: RESIDARMENIA, RESIDAZERBAIJAN, RESIDGEORGIA, RESIDMACEDONIA, RESIDUKRAINE 
Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
Automatic selection of maximum lags   
Automatic selection of lags based on SIC: 0 to 2 
Newey-West bandwidth selection using Bartlett kernel 
         
      Cross-   
Method  Statistic  Prob.**  sections  Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t*  -2.98818   0.0014   14   164 
Breitung t-stat  -1.41211   0.0790   14   150 
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
53Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat   -1.25651   0.1045   14   164 
ADF – Fisher Chi-square   33.0172   0.2351   14   164 
PP - Fisher Chi-square   42.5182   0.0387   14   168 
Null: No unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Hadri Z-stat   4.57709   0.0000   14   182 
         
** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asympotic Chi -square distribution. 
      All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
Table A7: List of the Countries 
El Salvador  Namibia  United Arab Emirates  Netherlands 
Equatorial Guinea  Nepal  Uruguay  New Zealand 
Developing 
economies 
Ethiopia  Nicaragua  Venezuela   Norway 
Algeria  Gabon  Niger  Vietnam  Poland 
Argentina  Ghana  Nigeria  Yemen  Portugal 
Bahrain  Guatemala  Pakistan  Zambia  Romania 
Bangladesh  Guinea Bissau  Panama  Developed economies  Slovakia 
Belize  Haiti  Paraguay  Australia  Slovenia 
Benin  Honduras  Peru  Austria  Spain 
Bolivia  India  Philippines  Belgium  Sweden 
Botswana  Indonesia  Rwanda  Bulgaria  Switzerland 
Brazil  Iran  Samoa  Canada  United Kingdom 
Burkina Faso  Jamaica  Saudi Arabia  Cyprus  United States 
Burundi  Kenya  Senegal  Czech Republic  Economies in transition 
Cambodia  Kuwait  Singapore  Denmark  Armenia 
Cameroon  Lao   South Africa  Estonia  Azerbaijan 
Cape Verde  Lesotho  Sri Lanka  Finland  Georgia 
Central African  Libyan   Sudan  France  Kazakhstan 
Chad  Madagascar  Suriname  Germany  Kyrgyzstan 
Chile  Malawi  Swaziland  Greece  Tajikistan 
China  Malaysia  Syria  Hungary  Uzbekistan 
Colombia  Mali  Tanzania  Iceland  Albania 
Congo  Mauritania  Thailand  Ireland  Belarus 
Congo Democratic  Mauritius  Togo  Italy  Croatia 
Costa Rica  Mexico  Trinidad Tobago  Japan  Moldova 
Dominican Republic  Mongolia  Tunisia  Latvia  Russia 
Ecuador  Morocco  Turkey  Lithuania  Macedonia 
Egypt  Mozambique  Uganda  Malta  Ukraine 
 